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S U M M A R Y
Background: The severity of an outbreak is a priority in decision-making for human infection control.
However, there have been no reports on how to quantify the severity of an outbreak.
Methods: We propose a simple method to measure the severity of an infectious disease outbreak. It
involves scoring the severity of clinical signs, the transmission of the infection, the number of cases, and
the infection source.
Results: The method was evaluated using the data available at the early stage of some recent outbreaks
of infectious diseases, including the inﬂuenza A (H1N1) pandemic in 2009, and the evaluation supports
the design idea.
Conclusion: The method is practical for rating the severity of an infectious disease outbreak, though it
should be optimized. It could also be used to judge whether an event constitutes a public health
emergency of international concern (PHEIC) or not.
 2010 International Society for Infectious Diseases. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Decisions on whether or not to instigate emergency measures
to control an outbreak of an infectious disease usually rely on the
identiﬁcation of the pathogen. However, the ‘golden time’ for
infection control could be lost because pathogen identiﬁcation
may be time-consuming or even wrong, especially for some new
emerging infectious diseases. Severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) is a good example.1,2 The ﬁrst human case of SARS occurred
in November 2002 in Guangdong, China. By February 9, 2003, 305
cases of SARS with ﬁve fatalities had been reported in Guangdong,
and its transmission among people without close contact was
likely. Emergency measures such as isolation of patients and
movement restrictions were not implemented until the pathogen
was correctly identiﬁed in March 2003. As a result, the outbreak
ﬁnally spread to approximately 30 countries with more than 8000
probable cases and 800 fatalities (www.who.int/csr/sars/en/). The
outbreak of Nipah virus in Malaysia is another good example.3,4 It
started in September 1998 in the village of Ampang in the Kinta
district, where several cases of fatal febrile encephalitis in humans
followed respiratory and encephalitic diseases in pigs. By March 6,* Corresponding author.
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at an accelerated rate, with a high fatality (>40%). The outbreak
was linked to diseased pigs and was initially incorrectly diagnosed
as Japanese encephalitis. Emergency measures were not imple-
mented until the pathogen was correctly identiﬁed as the Nipah
virus on March 19, 1999. As a result, the outbreak involved 265
human cases with 115 fatalities and the culling of more than 1
million pigs.3
In addition, important emergency measures may sometimes
not be implemented to control a severe outbreak because the
pathogen is assumed to be empirically or legally not serious. The
Streptococcus suis crisis in 2005 in China is a case in point.5 It began
in a region of Sichuan Province with a dozen cases with severe
clinical signs between July 12 and July 21, 2005. Up until July 24,
2005, 58 cases with 17 fatalities were reported, and the outbreak
was linked to diseased pigs. No evidence of human-to-human
transmission was found. Two days later, the pathogen was
identiﬁed as Streptococcus suis, and emergency measures such as
hygiene education, pig vaccination, and proper disposal of dead
pigs, were implemented. However, culling of the infected or
possibly infected pigs was not implemented because the pathogen
is usually assumed not to be that serious. Consequently, the
outbreak was protracted, lasting until to the end of August 2005
with 157 more cases and 20 more fatalities (China’s ofﬁcial
website, www.xinhuanet.com).ses. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Table 1
Scoring of four aspects for the evaluation of the severity of a disease outbreak
Aspect Description Score
Clinical signs Mild, usually requiring treatment without hospitalization 2
Severe, usually requiring hospitalization, but without severe outcomes like death, abortion, or body abnormality 3
Severe, <10% cases having developed severe outcomes like death, abortion, or body abnormality 4
Very severe, 10–20% cases having developed severe outcomes like death, abortion, or body abnormality 5
Highly severe, >20% cases having developed severe outcomes like death, abortion, or body abnormality 6
Transmission No evidence supporting person-to-person transmission 1
Transmission through special behaviors such as sex is probable 2
Transmission among frequent close contacts is probable 3
Transmission among casual close contacts is probable 4
Transmission among people without close contact is probable 5
Number of cases 1–9 1
10–50 2
51–100 3
101–200 4
>200 5
Infection sourcea Without links to domestic animals 1
With a possible link to domestic animals 2
With clear evidence to support domestic animals as an infection source 3
a If the infection is from domestic animals, the infected animals should pose a threat to people. In addition, emergency mass surveillance, vaccination, and culling of
domestic animals, which are difﬁcult and of economic signiﬁcance, may have to be implemented to control the human outbreak. Therefore, the infection source is considered
in this scoring system.
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time, emergency measures should be implemented as soon as
possible if the outbreak is known to be serious, no matter what the
pathogen is. This concept appears rational because some effective
emergency measures, such as isolation of patients, movement
restriction of close contacts, travel alerts, case reporting, extensive
disinfection, and eliminating the possible infection sources, could
be implemented before the identiﬁcation of the pathogen.
However, currently no method has been formulated to rate the
severity of an outbreak of a human infectious disease. In effect, it is
difﬁcult to evaluate the severity of an outbreak rationally and
practically, especially at the early stage of the outbreak. The word
‘rationally’ requires us to considermultiple aspects of the outbreak,
including clinical signs and outcomes, transmission rate and
numbers of cases, while the word ‘practically’ means the
evaluation should be easy to understand and operate.
Here, we report a seemingly rational and practical method,
carefully designed to measure the severity of an outbreak of
infectious disease, which could be the prototype of a future
standardization.
2. The method
Themethod involves respectively scoring the severity of clinical
signs, transmission of the infection, number of cases, and the
infection source (Table 1). The scores of the four aspects of an
outbreak are multiplied together and the resulting product
represents the severity of the outbreak. A higher product indicates
a more serious outbreak, with products in the ranges of 1–14, 15–
29, 30–59, 60–119, 120–200, 200–450 rating the severity of the
outbreak as grade I, grade II, grade III, grade IV, grade V, and grade
VI, respectively. For example, if a total of 27 people are infected in
an outbreak with mild clinical signs, likely with transmission
among frequent close contacts, and the outbreak is linked to sheep
(though no clear evidence has been found), the ﬁnal score of the
outbreak is 24 (= 2  3  2  2), which suggests the outbreak is of
grade II severity.
In the method, a case is deﬁned as a person suspected to be
infected with the same known or unknown pathogen by a medical
professional entity, like a hospital, a medical research institute, or
the health section of the local government.
Generally speaking, grade I, grade II, grade III, grade IV, grade V,
and grade VI indicate that the outbreak is mild, moderate, severe,very severe, highly severe, and extremely severe. Moreover, if an
outbreak is rated grade III (severe), it is assumed to be a public
health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), and should be
reported to the World Health Organization (WHO), according to
the new International Health Regulations adopted in 2005.6
3. Explanation and discussion
In epidemiology, the four aspects (severity of clinical signs,
transmission of the infection, number of cases, and infection
source) largely determine the severity of the future development of
an outbreak if no emergencymeasures are implemented to control
the outbreak. Crude (not exact) data on these four aspects required
by the method are usually available at the early stages of an
outbreak, provided it has aroused the concerns of a medical
professional entity. Therefore, the method is practical.
In total there are 375 combinations of the four aspects in this
evaluation system, and the evaluation results of these 375
combinations largely support the design idea that a higher score
product indicates a more serious outbreak.
The method does not directly consider other aspects including
the basic reproduction rate, the generation time, and age
distribution. These aspects actually overlap with the aforemen-
tioned four aspects, or they have little impact on the future
development of an outbreak.
Using this method, the human outbreaks of SARS virus, Nipah
virus, and Streptococcus suis described above would be rated as
grade IV (very severe), grade III (severe) and grade III (severe),
respectively, at their early stages, according to the data given in the
Introduction (Table 2). Based on the data published by theWHO on
April 24, 2009, the infection with the inﬂuenza A (H1N1) virus in
Mexico would be scored as 120 and rated as grade IV (Table 2).
Like the rating of an earthquake in seismology, the quantitative
evaluation of the severity of an outbreak of a human infectious
disease should be important in infection control, especially for
emerging infectious diseases. It allows awareness of the exact
severity of an outbreak of infectious disease using the same rule. It
could also be used to determine what measures should be
implemented to control an outbreak of infectious disease and
whether the outbreak should be reported and controlled locally,
nationally, or internationally, no matter whether the pathogen has
been identiﬁed or not. According to the new International Health
Regulations adopted in 2005, all events that may constitute a
Table 2
Evaluation of the severity of four outbreaks of human infectious disease in the early stage
SARS virus Nipah virus Streptococcus suis Inﬂuenza A (H1N1) virusa
Affected country China Malaysia China Mexico
Date for evaluation February 9, 2003 March 6, 1999 July 24, 2005 April 24, 2009
Score for clinical signs 4 6 6 4
Score for transmission 4 1 1 4
Score for number of cases 5 3 3 5
Score for infection source 2 2 1 2
Product of the scores 4451=80 6132=36 6132=36 4452=160
Grade IV III III IV
SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome.
a The calculationwas based on the data published by theWHOonApril 24, 2009, which stated, ‘‘the number of cases has risen steadily through April and as of 23 April there
are now more than 854 cases of pneumonia from the capital. Of those, 59 have died.’’ Therefore, the score of clinical signs is 4. In addition, of the Mexican cases, 18 were
laboratory-conﬁrmed in Canada as swine inﬂuenza A (H1N1), while 12 of thesewere genetically identical to the swine inﬂuenza A (H1N1) viruses from California. This shows
a possible link between the outbreak and pigs, obtained from pathogen sequences, though no laboratory data were available to support the link.
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PHEIC in a practical way remains difﬁcult (www.who.int/entity/
csr/ihr/en/). The above evaluation method should be helpful to
judge whether the outbreak of an infectious disease is of PHEIC or
not, at least when its pathogen has not been identiﬁed.
Unlike the degree of severity of an earthquake, the severity of an
outbreak of infectious disease is dynamic. It may be rated grade I
(mild) at the beginning, but when more cases emerge and more
characteristics of the outbreak are known later, the outbreak could
be re-evaluated as grade II (moderate) or higher. An outbreak may
also be rated grade V (severe) at the beginning, butwhenmore data
are available to clarify some aspects, the outbreak could be re-
evaluated as grade II (moderate). For example, with the exact data
available in April–June, 2009, the severity of the human inﬂuenza A
(H1N1) pandemic would initially have been rated as grade V
(highly severe), and could have been rated as grade III (severe) on
July 1, 2009, because the clinical signs of the infections were then
considered mild and the possible link of the infections to domestic
animals were excluded .
We recognize that there is great uncertainty as to whether the
method will actually do what is desired. The method allows for
others to tailor it through the addition of new parameters or by
adjusting the scoring system. As, we assume, the ﬁrst method onthis important issue, it will spark discussion among public health
experts and provide a candidate prototype for future standardiza-
tion.
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